declarative and declarative memory. Non-declarative memory includes nonverbal or procedural information. For example, the memories needed for physically riding a bicycle or playing a musical instrument would be considered part of non-declarative memory whereas declarative memory contains verbal information. Declarative memory can be classified as either semantic memory, which is made up of facts and general knowledge, or episodic memory, which is made up of personal experiences in one's life (Tulving, 1993) . Baddeley (1986) replaced the concept of short-term memory with "working" memory. Working memory is the structure that allows us to gain access to and apply information in long-term memory to situations and problems that we encounter. While similar to short-term memory, an important difference between short-term memory and working memory is that working memory manipulates or elaborates on the information that is stored in long-term memory.
Autobiographical Memory and Depression
Autobiographical memory is a part of episodic memory that contains an individual's personal history of life events. Williams and Broadbent (1986) found that depressed and parasuicidal individuals performed poorly on a task now called the autobiographical memory task (AMT) in which subjects were asked to retrieve specific memories (single occasions or events that did not last longer than one day) in response to positive or negative cue words. Williams (2005) describes the AMT as a "…widely used method of assessing personal event memory in people with emotional disturbance" (p. 1).
In the original application of the AMT to suicide attempters, Williams and Broadbent presented 10 emotional cue words to participants and gave them one minute to retrieve a specific memory in response to each cue word. The words were originally presented in a fixed order from the following : happy, sorry, safe, angry, interested, clumsy, successful, hurt, surprised and lonely. The participants were asked to retrieve a specific memory defined as an event that lasted less than one day and occurred at a particular time and place. Williams suggests prompting participants to retrieve a specific memory on at least two practice words before proceeding with AMT administration. Any subsequent prompting is left to the discretion of the experimenter. Memories are coded as either specific or non-specific. Specific autobiographical memories are those that satisfy the instruction criteria of an event that occurred at a specific place and time and that lasted less than one day . Williams suggests separating non-specific memories into categories of semantic associates, general categoric memories, general extended memories, and omissions.
The AMT has been occasionally modified by administrators by adding more cue words, decreasing the time allowed to respond to 30 seconds, and adding neutral cue words (Williams, 2005) . Recent variations have included a computerized version of the original AMT whereby participants type responses (in contrast to an interview format), as well as a sentence-completion format (Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2007; Rekart, Mineka, & Zinbarg, 2006) .
In their original study, Williams and Broadbent (1986) concluded that poor performance on the AMT by depressed and suicidal subjects was accounted for by a tendency to incorrectly produce overgeneral memories (OGM) instead of specific ones.
For example, a specific autobiographical memory to the cue word happy could be as follows: One Christmas morning I received a new watch from my brother. An example of an overgeneral memory, and one more likely to be produced by depressed and parasuicidal individuals, might be: Whenever we would celebrate Christmas mornings.
Researchers have consistently found that clinically depressed individuals as well as individuals with other emotional disorders such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), eating disorders, borderline personality disorder, and acute stress disorder show an overgeneral style of autobiographical memory (Kuyken, Howell & Dalgleish, 2006; Mackinger, Leibetseder, Pachinger & Fartacek, 2000; Moffitt, Singer, Nelligan, Carlson & Vyse, 1994; Raes et al., 2006; Williams & Dritschel, 1988) . The relationship between overgeneral memory and clinical depression has been referred to as "…one of the most reliable features of memory in depression" (Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999, p. 512) .
The relationship between depression and overgeneral memory is thought to have important implications for mental health. Williams (1996) proposed that overgeneral memories do not contain specific details relevant to an individual's personal experiences, and can lead to difficulty in emotional and cognitive areas. Specifically, Williams proposed that overgeneral memory causes episodes of emotional disturbance to be more persistent. It also impairs interpersonal problem-solving ability because past experiences cannot be used as references for effective coping strategies, and it impairs a person's ability to imagine specific scenarios in the future. Thus, when a person is depressed, he or she is likely to either solve interpersonal problems poorly or avoid them completely.
Without a specific record of our past successes and failures, it would be difficult to select the best problem-solving strategies when we encounter similar problems in the future that we have faced in the past (Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, & Duggan, 2006) . These problems may lead to further depression resulting from factors such as increased stress and hopelessness. In fact, reduced AMS has been found to be predictive of slower recovery from clinical depression in longitudinal studies (Brewin et al., 1999; Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993) . Brewin et al. (1999) found that overgeneral memory was associated with increased reports of spontaneous, intrusive memories of stressful events which were correlated with level of depression at a 6-month follow-up. Brittlebank et al. (1993) assessed subjects' number of overgeneral memories on the AMT as well as the level of depressive symptomology with the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD) at baseline, 3-month, and 7-month follow-ups. The number of overgeneral responses was positively correlated with HRSD scores accounting for 33% of the variance at 7-month follow-up. Moreover, level of overgeneral memory did not change from baseline to the 7-month follow-up assessment raising the question of whether the relationship between overgeneral autobiographical memory and depression represents a trait of individuals with depression or a phenomenon of depressed mood state.
Overgeneral Memory as a Trait v. State Phenomenon in Depression
The numerous findings of a relationship between depression and overgeneral memory have led some authors to conclude that it is a stable marker of clinical depression independent of mood state (Van Vreeswijk & de Wild, 2004) . In this view, overgeneral memory is a trait-like marker differentiating candidates for a clinical diagnosis of a depressive disorder rather than a factor related to a current mood state. Support for this model comes from Mackinger, Leibetseder, Pachinger, and Fartacek (2000) as well as Spinhoven et al. (2006) who found that overgeneral memory persists in formerly depressed individuals even when current mood is undisturbed.
Recent findings, however, suggest that the relationship between depression and overgeneral memory is not related to a trait-like marker of clinical depression. Rather it is due to experiencing a time-limited, negative shift in overall mood (Au Yeung, Dalgleish, Golden, & Schartau, 2006; McBride, Segal, Kennedy, & Gemar, 2007; Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000) . Au Yeung et al. (2006) These findings suggest that overgeneral memory is not solely a trait of vulnerability to major depression. Au Yeung, et al. (2006) Williams et al., 2007) .
Executive Control
Baddeley (1986) proposed a model of working memory that revised the concept of short-term memory introduced in the information-processing model of Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) . Baddeley originally proposed that working memory is made up of at least three structures responsible for different processes in working memory. These structures are called the central executive, which is thought to be responsible for the allocation of attentional resources to cognitive tasks such as problem solving, the visuo-spatial sketchpad or scratchpad, which is responsible for visual and spatial information, and the phonological or articulatory loop, which is responsible for processing auditory or language-based information (Rosen & Engle, 1997) . Baddeley proposed that the visuospatial sketchpad and phonological loop can function rather independently and automatically to work with information stored in long-term memory, but require the effortful control of the central executive to select information from memory that is most relevant to the task at hand. If attentional resources are being used by other cognitive tasks, then additional demands are placed on the central executive and working memory may operate in ways that are less productive than under normal conditions.
Depression, Executive Control, and Autobiographical Memory
The results of studies implicating the central executive in depression and overgeneral memory have not been completely consistent. One theory of the relationship between overgeneral memory, depression, and executive control has employed the concept of a truncated, hierarchy-based memory search (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Oaksford, Grainger, Morris, & Williams, 1996 .
This model proposes that generating a specific autobiographical memory requires a top-down process, whereby in response to a cue word an individual initiates a search through a series of categories in long-term memory that increase in complexity and specificity the further one progresses down the hierarchy (Williams, Chan, Crane, & Barnhofer, 2006) . The stages of the hierarchy correspond to semantic associations, generic categorical memories, and specific memories. presented the following example. A participant is presented with the cue word "angry." The next step is generation of a general semantic associate for the word-"My dad." Next, a generic or categorical memory is generated for the cue-word-"Every time I failed an exam my dad used to criticize me." Finally, a specific memory, a single event that lasted no longer than one day, is generated-"The time he threw a fit when I told him my marks" (p. 353). The authors suggest the tendency for depressed individuals to produce overgeneral memories in response to emotional cue-words is the result of a truncated search. In other words, these individuals pre-maturely stop their memory search at a higher, less specific stage of the hierarchy.
Consistent with this proposal, observed that subjects produced significantly more specific memories on the AMT when the cue-words were rated as high in imageability, thereby making it possible to have more sensory/perceptual cues for the search. When participants were given cue-words with less imageability (making the search more effortful), they retrieved more general memories. Explanations for this truncated search have included the role of executive control.
Executive control has been broadly defined as "…the set of cognitive processes that are responsible for the planning, initiation, sequencing, and monitoring of complex goal-directed behavior in the face of distracting information" (Dalgleish et al., 2007, p. 25) . Dalgleish et al. proposed that overgeneral memory may result from poor retrieval strategies, difficulty in maintaining and/or applying task instructions, and/or difficulty inhibiting inappropriate responses during the task, i.e. executive control issues. tested the involvement of executive control processes within the hierarchical search model. The authors predicted that if less executive control capacity is required for a general memory (i.e. retrieval at a higher level of the search hierarchy), then the randomness of a concurrent random number generation task would be less disrupted if participants were explicitly asked for a general memory as compared to specific memories. Although the results showed that randomness was significantly greater at baseline than while also completing an autobiographical memory task, there was no significant difference between asking for general memories v. specific memories (study 2). This finding was inconsistent with the results of a previous study examining the effect of executive control on autobiographical memory (Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1998) .
In this study an autobiographical memory task was performed concurrently with a fourchoice reaction time task with varying levels of difficulty. The authors found that significantly more specific autobiographical memories were recalled in the easy conditions and more generic autobiographical memories were recalled in the difficult conditions. This represents a problem in inhibiting incorrect responses, and is thus associated with executive control.
There have been mixed results from studies examining executive control and depression. For example, one investigation into depression-specific memory disturbances found that depressed participants demonstrated deficits in all aspects of working memory (Christopher & MacDonald, 2005) . However, Channon et al. (1993) tested several aspects of working memory in depressed and healthy control subjects and found that clinically depressed participants and control participants did not differ on several measures involving the phonological loop or visual-spatial sketchpad. With regard to central executive processing, depressed participants differed significantly on a backward digit span task. Other tasks used for measuring central executive functioning showed no difference between depressed subjects and controls. Rose and Ebmeier (2006) also found little effect of depression on the central executive. They compared the effects of depression on central executive working functioning using a parametric n-back task. This task involves presenting a participant with a series of four boxes on a screen for a brief period of time. The boxes are numbered, and one of them contains a colored dot. Participants are to respond with the number of the box that contained the dot. Task difficulty is manipulated by requiring the participant to report the dot's location on a specified trial that occurred before the current trial. For example, a 3-back task in this paradigm would require the participant to report the location of the dot three trials before. Rose and Ebmeier hypothesized that reaction time would increase and accuracy would decrease more with advancing task difficulty in depressed participants than in controls because the required attentional resources for this task would be expected to increase with task difficulty. Results indicated that cognitive load did not show the predicted effect on accuracy and reaction time. Dalgleish et al. (2007) proposed that mixed results concerning executive control and depression may be due to insufficient manipulation of the cognitive load of the participants in previous experiments. A recently conducted series of studies on the role of executive control in autobiographical memory found that manipulating cognitive load on the AMT by having participants attempt to remember strings of digits until after they had responded to AMT items resulted in diminished autobiographical memory specificity (Dalgleish et al., 2007, study 7) . They concluded that manipulation of executive control processes in ways that should impair retrieval of autobiographical memories should also influence AMS. These results are consistent with the findings presented above in which a backward digit-span task affected the memory performance of depressed participants more than the performance of control participants. Dalgleish et al. (2007) also found that the effect was more pronounced with in subjects with deeper levels of clinical depression over the previous week. This investigation, however, did not include current mood state as a variable.
Present Study
The present study was designed to address two areas of uncertainty concerning The present study employed a mood induction procedure and a task designed to interfere with working memory to test the role of current mood and executive function in overgeneral memory. The central hypothesis of this study, in line with the theoretical model reviewed by Williams et al. (2007) , was that impaired executive control occurs during a negative shift in mood. This factor that is responsible for the overgeneral memory observed following a negative mood shift (e.g., Au Yeung et al. 2006 ). Therefore, it was expected that a group of non-depressed college students' performance on an AMT would be impaired because of reduced executive control whether they experienced a negative shift in mood state via a musical mood induction procedure, or greater demand placed on central executive processing via a concurrent digit-recall task.
Music plus instruction was used as a mood induction procedure in the present study. Westermann, Spies, Stahl, and Hesse (1996) conducted a meta-analysis of the effects of various mood induction procedures and found a mean weighted effect size of 0.503 for mood induction procedures incorporating music clips plus instruction to participants. Of the 250 studies analyzed in this meta-analysis, 67% stated a main purpose of investigating the impact of emotion on other cognitive or behavioral variables.
The authors concluded that presentation of music clips along with instructions was superior to music alone which produced a mean weighted effect of 0.410. Furthermore, use of musical clips for induction of mood states was found to be approximately as effective as other established methods, including Velten procedures, social interaction, and feedback, but less effective than mood induction procedures utilizing film. A recent study, however, found no significant difference between mood induction procedures utilizing film clips and procedures utilizing music clips on autobiographical memory specificity and current mood state (Au Yeung et al., 2006) . Furthermore, recent developments suggest that musical mood induction procedures may be especially suitable to studying relationships between cognition and depression (Mongrain & Trambakoulos, 2007) . Therefore, the mood induction procedure selected for the current study was warranted.
Method

Subjects
The subjects were 81 (58 females and 23 males, mean age = 21.9 years) Marshall University students recruited from psychology classes. They received extra course credit for their participation. Students who were currently being treated for clinical depression by psychotherapy/counseling and/or medication or who had a significant hearing impairment were asked to refrain from signing up for the study. One participant requested to terminate his participation during the study and his data were excluded from the analysis.
Materials and measures
Demographic questionnaire. A brief demographics questionnaire was developed to gather basic information such as age, sex, and race (See Appendix A). In addition, an item asked participants whether they were currently being treated for a diagnosis of clinical depression by means of medication and/or therapy/counseling. The questionnaire also contained two items from the structured clinical interview (SCID) for the DSM-IV that have been used as a proxy measure for lifetime history of depression (Au Yeung et al., 2006) . The two SCID questions used were A1 (Has there ever been a period of time when you were feeling depressed or down most of the day, nearly every day? What was that like? How long did it last? As long as two weeks?) and A2 (Have you ever lost interest or pleasure in things you usually enjoyed? Was it nearly every day? How long did it last? As long as two weeks?) from the major depressive episode sections. Manipulation check. Self-report ratings of current mood state were obtained both before and after mood inductions with 7 point Likert scales of 10 different emotions (See Appendix B). The rating scale ranged from 1 (I don't feel this way at all) to 7 (I feel extremely this way). The measure included ten adjectives and included the following:
Satisfied, Down, Depressed, Pleased, Glum, Happy, Troubled, Sad, Glad, and Cheerful.
The words were presented in fixed, random order to all participants.
Autobiographical memory test (AMT).
The original interview format of the AMT was used for the present study in order to allow for simultaneous manipulation of executive control processes via a procedure similar to the one described by Dalgleish et al. (2007, study 7) . Two versions of the AMT were developed for the present study. Each version consisted of 20 cue words selected from those used in Brittlebank et al. (1993) presented in fixed, random order (See Appendix C and D (Williams, 2005) Three neutral, practice words were included for each version of the AMT. The practice words for Form A consisted of Car, Tree, and Chair, and the practice words for Form B consisted of Rain, Newspaper, and Milk. All participants were required to provide a specific memory for at least 2 of 3 practice trials before beginning the test trials. Subjects who were given digit recall instructions were additionally required to correctly recall three digits on 2 of 3 practice trials before beginning the test trials. Subjects were prompted for specific responses only during the practice trials preceding each administration of the AMT.
Design
The experiment employed a 2x2x2 split-plot factorial design with one withinsubjects factor, mood (Positive or Negative), and two between-subjects factors, mood order (Positive-Negative or Negative-Positive) and task type (Digit Recall Task or No Digit Recall Task). Participants were assigned to conditions by random assignment. To control for order effects, the order of presentation of both the autobiographical memory tests (Versions A and B) as well as the mood induction materials (negative and positive) were counterbalanced resulting in 8 conditions.
Procedure
All participants completed informed consent documents followed by the demographics questionnaire. The participants next rated their current, or baseline, mood level with the self-report mood rating form. Participants in the no digit recall condition then listened to their first mood induction for 5 minutes. They next completed the self-report mood rating form followed by Version A or B of the AMT. These participants then listened to the opposite mood induction for 5 minutes. Finally, they completed the selfreport mood rating form for a third time followed the other list version (A or B) of the AMT.
The digit recall condition was identical to the first condition with the exception that before each cue word of the AMT was presented subjects heard a three digit, random number they were to hold in memory and recall in proper order immediately following their memory response (See Appendix E and F for sequences). All administrations of the autobiographical memory tests were recorded with an Olympus digital voice recorder and responses were transcribed for scoring.
Results
Mood Manipulation
In order to verify whether the experimental mood induction was successful 
Autobiographical Memory Specificity
Number of specific memories recalled on each AMT was used as the dependent variable. Consistent with recommendations from Williams (2005) , responses were scored as specific only if they satisfied the criteria listed in the instructions of including an event that lasted less than one day and happened at a particular time and place, and were given within the 30-sec. time limit. All other responses were scored as non-specific and included semantic associations (words or phrases associated with the cue word, e.g., a
response of "Chocolate" with no further elaboration of a specific event), extended general memories (an event lasting longer than a day, e.g., "my vacation to Myrtle Beach last week"), categorical general memories (repeated activities, e.g., "going on trips to the mountains with my dad"), and omissions (no-response given or a response given after the 30-sec. time-limit).
The results were analyzed in a 2x2x2 analysis of variance with mood condition (Positive or Negative) as a within-subjects factor, and condition order (Positive-Negative or Negative-Positive) and Task (Digit Recall Task or No Digit Recall Task) as betweensubjects factors. The results indicated a significant main effect for mood, F(1,76) = 4.10, p < .05, η p 2 =.05. As can be seen in Figure 2 , subjects produced fewer specific memories on the AMT while in the negative mood than the positive mood. In addition, there was a significant main effect for Task, F(1,76) = 4.72, p < .05, η p 2 =.06. As is also apparent in Figure 2 , subjects in the digit recall condition recalled fewer specific memories than subjects in the non-digit recall condition. No other effects or interactions were significant, F < 1 in all cases. Error tabs reflect 95% confidence intervals.
Discussion
The purpose of the present study was to test the relationship between executive control, temporary mood, and overgeneral memory in non-depressed volunteers. As expected, non-depressed college students tended to recall significantly fewer specific memories on an autobiographical memory test following an induced, negative mood state. This finding provides support for the notion that overgeneral memory is not solely a trait-like characteristic of individuals suffering from clinical depression, but is clearly related to brief, state-like reductions in mood. Therefore, it cannot be used to differentiate between individuals with depressive traits and those without specific vulnerabilities to clinical depression. The present data suggest that overgeneral memory occurs in clinical depression because of current mood.
Placing demand on executive control processes with a concurrent digit-recall task also led to significantly fewer specific memories being recalled by participants. The present findings support and extend the findings of Williams et al. (2007) by including a measure of current mood-state. In the present study, interference of executive control processes led to reduced specificity on the AMT even when current, self-reported mood state was relatively positive. The overall implication for clinical psychology is that therapeutic treatments targeting cognitive processes that affect executive control are likely to be appropriate interventions for overgeneral memory, and improving overgeneral memory may be an important step in preventing relapse to clinical depression.
Evidence is emerging in support of this idea. For example, McBride et al. (2007) assigned depressed patients to either cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) or pharmacotherapy, and measured overgeneral memory before and after treatment. Results indicated that both groups showed a decrease in categoric, overgeneral memories, but that the CBT group showed a greater decrease in the number of extended, overgeneral memories leading to the conclusion that "…an intervention that specifically targets the cognitive system exerts a greater change in one type of overgeneral memory than an intervention that does not specifically target the cognitive system" (p. 151). Williams et al. (2000) assessed overgeneral memory of formerly depressed subjects prior to and 12 months after receiving either an 8-week course of mindfulness-based cognitive therapy focusing attention on everyday tasks (i.e. breathing), and to notice when one's attention has been diverted to distressing thoughts. TAU was defined as remaining under the care of a physician for the duration of the study, and employing whatever services would normally be used in the event of a depressive episode. Results showed that subjects who received the MBCT tended to produce more specific memories at a 12-week follow-up than the TAU controls. Williams et al. (2000) proposed that this was because MBCT includes a large number of tasks that teach improved observation of specific aspects of the environment which would potentially reduce overgeneral encoding of memories.
They also proposed that explicitly focusing on, and allowing mental events to occur without judging them or to trying to suppress or avoid them, as is done in MBCT, potentially reduced the tendency to truncate memory searches at an overgeneral level.
A potential limitation of the current study is that it included only one manipulation of executive control processes (digit recall) that contained the same number of digits in each trial. Similarly, the mood-induction materials used in this study included only one positive and one negative valence medium. Future studies varying the difficulty of executive processing tasks, such as those employed by Goddard et al. (1998) , as well as differing strengths of mood-induction media, such as the incremental methods employed by Mongrain and Trambakoulos (2007) , may make it possible for more sensitive examination of the relationship between executive control and mood-state.
A question raised by these findings concerns the mechanism by which executive functioning becomes reduced in depressed individuals if not by mood-state itself. One possible explanation is the contribution of rumination. Joorman and Gotlib (2008) define rumination as "recurrent and often unintentional and uncontrollable thoughts that involve negative, self-deprecating statements and pessimistic ideas about the self, the world, and the future" (p. 182). Rumination is considered to be a defining characteristic of certain psychological disorders including depression and PTSD, both of which have been associated with reduced autobiographical memory specificity .
Rumination as discussed by Joorman and Gotlib (2008) is proposed as a mechanism for inhibition failure in working memory in which negative, emotional memories and sensory/perceptual associations become activated by emotional cue words. The activation of emotional memories creates difficulty in inhibiting irrelevant information from occupying working memory, leading to difficulty in retrieval. Joorman and Gotlib utilized a task in which participants memorized two word lists after being informed that only one of the lists would need to be remembered later. Participants were then presented with a word and asked to indicate whether it was from the to-be-remembered list. Both clinically depressed participants and non-depressed participants who were experimentally
induced to feel sad were tested. They found that depressed participants showed greater intrusions of words from the not-to-be-remembered list when presented with negative words, and that this effect was correlated with self-reported rumination. In other words, depressed individuals were less able to remove irrelevant information (words from the tobe-ignored list) from working memory, thus interfering with their ability to inhibit potential incorrect responses. Depressed participants also showed greater difficulty removing irrelevant information from working memory than non-depressed control subjects who underwent a negative mood induction suggesting that this effect was not dependent on current mood state. It is possible, however, that the mood induction may not have been of sufficient strength for the non-depressed subjects.
Watkins and Brown (2002) also examined the relationship between depression and executive functioning involving rumination. They manipulated participants' level of ruminative thinking to assess its impact on a random number generation task, a task believed to be a measure of executive functioning (Jahanshahi, Saleem, Ho, Dirnberger, & Fuller, 2006) . Depressed and non-depressed controls completed the random number generation task following induced rumination by focusing on written items that were self and emotion focused (e.g., "Think about what your feelings might mean."), and induced distraction by focusing on items unrelated to feelings with an external focus (e.g., "Think about the shape of a large black umbrella.") (p.401). The results indicated that depressed participants performed more poorly on the random number generation task when compared to controls following the rumination induction, but not following the distraction induction. Singer and Dobson (2007) found similar effects when they trained formerly depressed patients in techniques of rumination, distraction, or acceptance of negative emotional states prior to receiving a negative mood induction. Control participants received no training prior to the mood induction. The subjects then engaged in the strategy in which they were trained following the negative mood induction. Results showed that subjects who used rumination maintained the intensity of the negative mood while subjects using distraction and/or acceptance techniques showed decreased negative mood. Assumptions of homogeneity of variance and sphericity were met. Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001
Assumptions of homogeneity of variance and sphericity were met.
